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NOTE
Corpus Linguistics: Misfire or More Ammo for the
Ordinary-Meaning Canon?
John D. Ramer*
Scholars and judges have heralded corpus linguistics—the study of language
through collections of spoken or written texts—as a novel tool for statutory
interpretation that will help provide an answer in the occasionally ambiguous
search for “ordinary meaning” using dictionaries. In the spring of 2016, the
Michigan Supreme Court became the first to use corpus linguistics in a major-
ity opinion. The dissent also used it, however, and the two opinions reached
different conclusions. In the first true test for corpus linguistics, the answer
seemed to be just as ambiguous as before.
This result calls into question the utility of corpus linguistics. If the Michigan
Supreme Court could reach opposite conclusions about the ordinary meaning
of a word when both opinions used the same database, can one really consider
corpus linguistics an effective aid to statutory interpretation? This Note first
argues that the Michigan Supreme Court’s majority opinion conducted a
flawed search of the database and that the dissent’s contrary conclusion was
correct.
In addition, this Note contends that transparency—the greatest strength of
corpus linguistics—outweighs the risk that judges may fail to use a corpus-
linguistics database accurately because that transparency permits advocates,
other judges, and legal scholars to review the court’s analysis, aiding appellate
review. Lastly, this Note includes recommended steps to guide the use of a
corpus-linguistics database in the search for ordinary meaning.
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Introduction
The judiciary says what a statute means1 in order “to give effect to the
law” a legislature enacted.2 To this end, courts “read the statute according to
its text.”3 If the legislature did not define a particular word, courts generally
look to the ordinary meaning of the word used4 at the time the legislature
adopted the statute.5 This interpretive method—commonly called the “ordi-
nary-meaning canon”6—assumes that a word’s ordinary meaning most “ac-
curately expresses the legislative purpose.”7
This inquiry sounds simple enough: courts merely ask how a word is (or
was) ordinarily understood. As one professor put it, the ordinary meaning is
“that which an ordinary speaker of the English language—twin sibling to the
common law’s reasonable person—would draw from the statutory text.”8
But putting the theory into practice can be difficult.
1. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1994) (“A judicial construc-
tion of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after
the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of
Dudley, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 524 (1829) (“The judicial department of every government is the
rightful expositor of its laws . . . .”).
2. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 217 (2010).
3. Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 812 (2010); see Levin v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1224, 1231 (2013).
4. E.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (“When terms used in
a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”).
5. See, e.g., Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2165 & n.2 (2015)
(using dictionaries from 1933 and 1934 to determine the meaning of “services” because Con-
gress added the relevant language to the federal bankruptcy law in 1934); Cuomo v. Clearing
House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 526 (2009) (determining the meaning of “visitation” in 1864, the
year Congress enacted the National Bank Act). Contra William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Stat-
utory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1479 (1987) (“Statutes, however, should—like
the Constitution and the common law—be interpreted ‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their
present societal, political, and legal context.”).
6. E.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 69 (2012).
7. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v.
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)).
8. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1509,
1511 (1998) (reviewing Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts
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In the last few decades, lawyers and judges have increasingly used dic-
tionaries to determine a word’s ordinary meaning.9 For example, the ordi-
nary-meaning canon was on display in Muscarello v. United States,10 when
the U.S. Supreme Court consolidated two criminal cases.11 In one case,
Frank Muscarello was arrested after driving to a drug deal with a handgun
locked in his truck’s glove compartment.12 In the other case, which had sim-
ilar facts, the defendants had stored their guns in the car’s trunk.13 In both
lower court opinions, the courts of appeals found that the defendants had
violated 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) because they “ ‘carrie[d]’ the guns during and
in relation to a drug trafficking offense.”14 The issue was whether the ordi-
nary meaning of the phrase “carries a firearm” included storing handguns in
a vehicle’s locked compartment.15
The Supreme Court looked to a number of sources in its attempt to
discern the phrase’s ordinary meaning. First, the Court looked to the Oxford
English Dictionary.16 Then it consulted Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, the Random House Dictionary of the English Language Una-
bridged, the Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology, the Oxford Dictionary of En-
glish Etymology, the King James Bible, Robinson Crusoe, and Moby Dick.17
The Court also cited articles from the New York Times, the Boston Globe, the
Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, and the Arkansas Gazette.18 After review-
ing all these sources (and others), the Court determined that the ordinary
meaning of “carrying a firearm” included driving a car with a gun in it.19
The dissent also conducted an extensive search for the word’s ordinary
meaning by consulting a legal dictionary, several translations of the Bible,
poems, and scripts from the film The Magnificent Seven and the television
and the Law (1997)); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12
Harv. L. Rev. 417, 417–18 (1899) (“Thereupon we ask, not what [the author] meant, but
what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the
circumstances in which they were used . . . .”).
9. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for
Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 483, 494–95 (2013)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s increasing use of dictionaries starting in the Rehnquist era);
e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566–67 (2012) (describing the issue
presented as determining the ordinary meaning of “interpreter” and then consulting ten dif-
ferent dictionaries).
10. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
11. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (alteration in original) (first quoting United States v. Muscarello, 106 F.3d 636
(5th Cir. 1997), and then quoting United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997)).
15. Id. at 127–28.
16. Id. at 128.
17. Id. at 128–29.
18. Id. at 129–30.
19. Id. at 131.
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shows M*A*S*H and Sesame Street.20 The ordinary-meaning analysis of both
opinions seemed somewhat haphazard.
To bring more statistical analysis to the ordinary-meaning canon,
then–law student Stephen Mouritsen,21 who held a master of arts in linguis-
tics with an emphasis in corpus linguistics,22 thought of a better way. He
proposed using corpus linguistics23—the study of language through collec-
tions of spoken or written texts, called corpora.24 These collections typically
take the form of digitized databases that are accessible through an online
interface.25 A user can search the corpus-linguistics database for a particular
word or phrase to study how that word or phrase has actually been used in
the texts collected in the corpus.26
One corpus-linguistics database is the Corpus of Contemporary Ameri-
can English (“COCA”), which “is the largest freely-available corpus of En-
glish.”27 The COCA contains more than 520 million words and is equally
divided among transcriptions of spoken language,28 fiction publications,29
20. Stephen C. Mouritsen, Comment, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Falla-
cies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1915, 1916–17 (sum-
marizing the dissent’s sources).
21. Mouritsen is now an associate at Cravath, Swaine, & Moore LLP in New York, an
adjunct professor at Brigham Young University, and a former law clerk to the Honorable
Justice Thomas Rex Lee of the Utah Supreme Court. Stephen Mouritsen Faculty Biography,
BYU Law, http://www.law2.byu.edu/faculty/profile_2016.php?id=234 [https://perma.cc/664H-
QFCC].
22. Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1970 n.*.
23. Id. at 1951–70.
24. Martin Weisser, Practical Corpus Linguistics: An Introduction to Corpus-
Based Language Analysis 13 (2016).
25. See id.
26. See Hans Lindquist, Corpus Linguistics and the Description of English 1, 5
(2009) (“At the centre of [corpus linguistics] is that the rules of language are usage-based . . . .
[And] if you are interested in the workings of a particular language, like English, it is a good
idea to study English in use.”).
27. Corpus Contemp. Am. Eng., http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ [https://perma.cc/GT9J-
9NNR].
28. What Kind of Texts Are in the Corpus?, Corpus Contemp. Am. Eng., https://corpus.
byu.edu/coca/help/texts.asp [https://perma.cc/CV5E-2DND] (“Transcripts of unscripted con-
versation from more than 150 different TV and radio programs (examples: All Things Consid-
ered (NPR), Newshour (PBS), Good Morning America (ABC), Today Show (NBC), 60 Minutes
(CBS), Hannity and Colmes (Fox), Jerry Springer, etc[.]).”).
29. Id. (“Short stories and plays from literary magazines, children’s magazines, popular
magazines, first chapters of first edition books 1990–present, and movie scripts.”).
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popular magazines,30 newspapers,31 and academic texts.32 Professor Mark
Davies, a corpus linguist, developed the COCA through his academic work
at Brigham Young University.33 The COCA is a “tagged corpus,”34 which
means that each word is labeled in reference to its particular part of
speech—for example, a noun or a verb.35 The COCA does not, however,
function like a search engine. The user cannot simply ask what the word
means. Instead, the database allows a user to review many instances of the
use of a word or phrase in the database’s collected texts.36
Mouritsen argued that the COCA’s utility in determining ordinary
meaning exceeds that of a dictionary37 because dictionaries provide a range
of permissible meanings only38: “A dictionary, it is vital to observe, never says
what meaning a word must bear in a particular context. Nor does it ever
purport to say this.”39 Mouritsen described a hypothetical, seemingly
modeled after Muscarello, where Judge A and Judge B disagree about the
ordinary meaning of a word, and both judges find support in different dic-
tionaries.40 As Mouritsen explained, assuming no additional evidence, the
30. Id. (“Nearly 100 different magazines, with a good mix (overall, and by year) between
specific domains (news, health, home and gardening, women, financial, religion, sports, etc.).
A few examples are Time, Men’s Health, Good Housekeeping, Cosmopolitan, Fortune, Christian
Century, Sports Illustrated, etc.”).
31. Id. (“Ten newspapers from across the US, including: USA Today, New York Times,
Atlanta Journal Constitution, San Francisco Chronicle, etc. In most cases, there is a good mix
between different sections of the newspaper, such as local news, opinion, sports, financial,
etc.”).
32. Id. (“Nearly 100 different peer-reviewed journals. These were selected to cover the
entire range of the Library of Congress classification system (e.g. a certain percentage from B
(philosophy, psychology, religion), D (world history), K (education), T (technology), etc.),
both overall and by number of words per year[.]”).
33. Davies created “[t]he underlying corpus architecture and web interface . . . . In most
cases, he also designed, collected, edited, and annotated the corpora as well,” but he also
received help from his BYU students to scan some of the sources. Frequently Asked Questions,
BYU Corpora, http://corpus.byu.edu/faq.asp#x1 [https://perma.cc/N37M-ZC7X].
34. This is also called a “lemmatized” corpus. See State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1281
n.28 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).
35. Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an
Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 156, 192 (2012).
36. See Susan Hunston, Corpora in Applied Linguistics 3 (2002) (“Strictly speak-
ing, a corpus by itself can do nothing at all, being nothing other than a store of used language.
Corpus access software, however, can rearrange that store so that observations of various kinds
can be made.”).
37. Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1956–57.
38. Id. at 1923 (“The implicit claim made when a given definition is included in a dic-
tionary is not that a particular meaning is correct or even common, but that its use, in a given
context, is verifiable.”); see also Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1273 (Lee, J., concurring) (“[T]he dic-
tionary generally cannot provide the basis for preferring one of its definitions over another.”).
39. Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1923 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr.
& Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Applica-
tion of Law 1190 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994)).
40. Id. at 1969.
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dispute is intractable because it is based on the judges’ differing intuitions
about the word’s ordinary meaning.41 In contrast, if Judge A uses a corpus-
based analysis, then Judge B “will have numerous ‘overt’ bases” to challenge
Judge A’s corpus analysis.42 In the first scenario, the disagreement is a meta-
physical debate; in the second scenario, the disagreement is an empirical
debate.43 This empiricism is the chief benefit of using a corpus-linguistics
database as a supplement to a dictionary. The corpus is “essentially tell[ing]
us what a language is like, and the main argument in favour of using a
corpus is that it is a more reliable guide to language use than native speaker
intuition.”44
Since the publication of Mouritsen’s note,45 lawyers and judges have oc-
casionally used corpus linguistics to aid in statutory interpretation.46 Most
recently, the Michigan Supreme Court became the first state supreme court
to do so.47 Interestingly, the dissent also used it but disagreed with the ma-
jority’s corpus analysis.48 Some judges are driving forward into the frontier
with corpus linguistics.49 Some judges think the databases are too compli-
cated to use and should only be considered when the parties cite to a
database in their brief.50 Others think judicial recognition of corpus linguis-
tics will force parties to hire linguistics experts, which will unduly add to the
costs of litigation.51
This Note analyzes the judicial use of corpus linguistics in statutory in-
terpretation through the lens of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in
People v. Harris.52 Part I explains the evolution of using corpus linguistics—
specifically the COCA—in statutory interpretation and examines the Harris
opinions’ corpus-linguistics analyses. Part II contends that neither opinion
in Harris conducted a complete analysis of the COCA but that the dissent
reached the correct result. And Part III recites some common criticism of
the COCA, addresses this criticism, and briefly suggests practical steps for
using the COCA.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1969–70 (noting that Judge B could attack the corpus selection, the construc-
tion of the corpus, or the analysis of the corpus).
43. Id. at 1970.
44. Hunston, supra note 36, at 20.
45. See Mouritsen, supra note 20.
46. See infra Sections I.A–I.B.
47. Gordon Smith, Michigan Supreme Court Embraces Corpus Linguistics, Conglomer-
ate (June 28, 2016), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2016/06/michigan-supreme-court-em
braces-corpus-linguistics.html [https://perma.cc/5SUK-DMAD].
48. See People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 850 n.14 (Mich. 2016) (Markman, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
49. See, e.g., State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271–90 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 1269–71 (Durrant, C.J., concurring).
51. Id. at 1265 (majority opinion) (stating that the use of corpus linguistics could impose
“such a significant financial burden on so many of the litigants coming through the doors of
our courts [that it] would be tantamount to locking those doors for all but the most affluent”).
52. 885 N.W.2d 832.
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I. The Background of Corpus Linguistics in the Law
Part I traces the history of corpus linguistics in statutory interpretation.
Section I.A discusses the emergence of corpus linguistics in scholarship, ad-
vocacy, and judicial decisionmaking. Section I.B examines the Michigan Su-
preme Court’s use of corpus linguistics in People v. Harris by detailing the
different types of searches that both the majority and the dissent used in
their respective analyses.
A. The Legacy of Corpus Linguistics in Statutory Interpretation
Before the COCA appeared in any judicial opinions, it debuted in an
amicus brief before the U.S. Supreme Court. In FCC v. AT&T Inc.,53 the
Court had to determine whether corporations had “personal privacy” or if
the phrase applied only to humans.54 The Project on Government Oversight
(“POGO”) submitted an amicus brief that used multiple corpora to deter-
mine the ordinary meaning of “personal privacy.”55 Specifically, POGO used
tagged corpora,56 including the COCA, which allowed POGO to search for
nouns that the adjective “personal” most often modified.57 POGO included
the corpora’s data in its brief.58 At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg asked
AT&T’s attorney to respond specifically to POGO’s amicus brief.59 Corpus
linguistics had arrived.
In 2015, Justice Lee of the Utah Supreme Court used corpus linguistics
(and specifically the COCA) in a judicial opinion.60 In State v. Rasabout, the
Utah Supreme Court had to determine whether the phrase “discharge of a
firearm” constituted firing one bullet only or included firing one sequence
of several bullets.61 The defendant, Andy Rasabout, had fired twelve shots
53. 562 U.S. 397 (2011).
54. AT&T, 562 U.S. at 399–400. The case arose out of a FOIA request for correspon-
dence that the FCC had on file from an earlier investigation of AT&T. Id. at 400. The FCC
withheld some of the requested information under FOIA Exemption 7(C), which protects
“ ‘records or information’ . . . that ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.’ ” Id. at 401 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006)).
55. See Brief for the Project on Government Oversight et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 13–20, AT&T, 562 U.S. 397 (No. 09-1279), 2010 WL 5069527, at *13–20 [here-
inafter POGO Amicus Brief] (concluding that only humans could have “personal privacy” in
the ordinary sense of the phrase).
56. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
57. POGO Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 16 (searching the COCA; the TIME Corpus of
American English, a 100 million-word corpus of texts taken from Time magazine; and the
Corpus of Historical American English).
58. Id. at 16–20.
59. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, AT&T, 562 U.S. 397 (No. 09-1279) (“JUSTICE
GINSBURG: Mr. Klineberg, you have read the brief of the Project on Government Oversight,
where they give dozens and dozens of examples to show that, overwhelmingly, ‘personal’ is
used to describe an individual, not an artificial being.”).
60. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1281–82 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 1262 (majority opinion).
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during a drive-by shooting.62 He was charged with twelve felony counts of
“unlawful discharge of a firearm”—one charge for each bullet.63 On appeal,
Rasabout argued that the phrase “discharge of a firearm” ordinarily means
one shooting sequence, regardless of how many bullets were fired.64 Justice
Lee searched the COCA to locate all the instances where the word “dis-
charge” appeared within five words of either “firearm,” “firearms,” “gun,” or
“weapon.”65 His search returned eighty-six instances.66 And the returns over-
whelmingly suggested that “discharge of a firearm” refers to the firing of a
single bullet.67 In fact, he found only one instance that unambiguously sup-
ported Rasabout’s argument.68 Therefore, Justice Lee concluded that “dis-
charge of a firearm” ordinarily means firing of only one shot.69
Justice Lee’s colleagues did not embrace his use of the COCA. The ma-
jority stated that it refused to follow his approach because the parties did not
brief it and because it was sua sponte scientific research with no scientific
review.70 The majority then wrote that no judge would be able to analyze the
COCA reliably because most judges are generalists and do not have the “sci-
entific expertise” to use the COCA.71 The Rasabout majority also thought
that permitting the use of the COCA would force parties to hire linguistics
experts, which would “[i]mpos[e] such a significant financial burden on so
many of the litigants coming through the doors of our courts [that it] would
be tantamount to locking those doors for all but the most affluent.”72
Chief Justice Durrant concurred in part, but he took a more conciliatory
tone with regard to Justice Lee’s corpus-linguistics analysis.73 The chief jus-
tice wrote that, although corpus linguistics could be a great aid to statutory
interpretation, the parties—not the court—should conduct the analysis be-
cause then the adversaries could challenge one another’s database, method-
ology, and conclusion.74 The Utah Supreme Court’s differing views raised a
number of questions about the use of corpus linguistics for statutory inter-
pretation, especially by judges sua sponte.
62. Id. at 1260.
63. See id. at 1261.
64. Id. at 1264.
65. Id. at 1281–82 (Lee, J., concurring).
66. Id. But five of the instances were dismissed as duplicates. Id. at 1282 n.30.
67. Id. at 1282.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1264–65 (majority opinion).
71. Id. at 1265 (“Indeed, we are aware of almost no one sitting on the bench or practic-
ing law in this state who has the scientific expertise required to reliably conduct the research
Justice Lee requires.”).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1269 (Durant, C.J., concurring) (“I applaud Justice Lee for his thoughtful ex-
ploration of corpus linguistics as a potential additional tool for our statutory interpretation
tool box.”).
74. Id. at 1270.
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B. The Michigan Supreme Court’s Use of the COCA
In the spring of 2016, the Michigan Supreme Court became the first
state supreme court to use the COCA in a majority opinion when it decided
People v. Harris.75 The dissent also used the COCA but executed a different
search method and ultimately disagreed with the majority’s analysis.76 This
Section reviews these two opinions. Section I.B.1 discusses the facts of the
case. Section I.B.2 examines the Harris majority’s COCA analysis. And Sec-
tion I.B.3 examines the Harris dissent’s COCA analysis.
1. Factual Background
Harris arose out of an alleged assault at a Detroit gas station.77 Dajuan
Hodges-Lamar was sitting in his parked car at the gas station when Detroit
Police Officer Hughes approached him.78 After Hughes asked Hodges-Lamar
some questions, Hughes suddenly began beating him, while Hughes’s fellow
officers, Harris and Little, watched.79 After the attack, the Detroit Police De-
partment’s Office of the Chief Investigator opened an internal investigation
that required all three officers (Hughes, Harris, and Little) either to testify at
a Garrity hearing80 or potentially face termination.81 At the hearing, the in-
vestigators asked about the altercation, and all three officers denied using
any more force than was necessary.82 The Detroit Police Department’s Inter-
nal Affairs Section later obtained the gas station’s video-surveillance foot-
age,83 which showed the officers had made false statements.84 As a result, the
State charged all three officers with obstruction of justice.85
75. Smith, supra note 47.
76. See People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 850 n.14 (Mich. 2016) (Markman, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 834 (majority opinion).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. A Garrity hearing is named for the Supreme Court’s decision in Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See People v. Brown, 755 N.W.2d 664, 683 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008)
(“Essentially, a Garrity hearing allows the interviewee to answer questions with the knowledge
that any statements elicited therein will not be used against him in criminal proceedings.”).
81. Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 834 (stating that the officers received an advice-of-rights form
warning the officers that if they refused to answer questions they would be subject to depart-
mental charges, potentially including dismissal from the police force).
82. Id. at 835.
83. Plaintiff-Appellee’s Amended Brief on Appeal at 5, Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832 (Nos.
149872, 149873 & 150042), 2015 WL 9874034, at *5.
84. Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 835. The video showed Hughes “striking Hodges-Lamar with
an open hand in the throat, punching him again, pushing him to the ground, picking him up
by the collar several times, slamming him onto the car, and pushing him back toward Harris
and Little.” Id. at 835 n.4; see also WXYZ-TV Detroit Channel 7, DPD Beating Caught on Tape,
YouTube (June 30, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZSoihW83k4 [https://perma.
cc/2C35-WXGZ].
85. Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 835.
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Despite the dramatic circumstances, the case’s outcome came down to
the ordinary meaning of the word “information.” In the Michigan trial
court, the officers argued that their statements were protected by Michigan’s
Disclosures by Law Enforcement Officers Act,86 which states that “any infor-
mation derived from [an] involuntary statement, shall not be used against
the law enforcement officer in a criminal proceeding.”87 Section 15.391 of
the Michigan Compiled Laws defines “involuntary statement” as “informa-
tion provided by a law enforcement officer, if compelled under threat of
dismissal from employment.”88 The officers argued that their statements,
though false, still constituted “information,” so the Act prohibited the State
from using the statements to support the obstruction of justice charges.89
The Michigan trial court agreed and dismissed the charges.90 The Michigan
Court of Appeals later reversed, mostly basing its decision on the dictionary
definition of “information.”91
The issue, once it reached the Michigan Supreme Court, was whether
the definition of “information” includes false statements.92 All four Michi-
gan appellate opinions—two majorities and two dissents—stated that the
goal was to find the plain meaning of the word “information.”93 And at the
Michigan Supreme Court, both the majority and the dissent used the
COCA.94
2. The Majority Opinion’s Use of the COCA
The majority described its task as interpreting “information” “according
to the common and approved usage of the language” and turned to the
86. Id.
87. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.393 (West 2004 & Supp. 2017).
88. Id. § 15.391 (West 2004 & Supp. 2017).
89. Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 835–36.
90. Id. at 835.
91. People v. Hughes, 855 N.W.2d 209, 216 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Harris,
885 N.W.2d 832.
92. Harris, 855 N.W.2d at 838.
93. Id. at 837 (“The plain language of the [Act] controls our resolution of this dis-
pute . . . .”); id. at 845 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I agree with
the Court of Appeals that false statements do not constitute ‘information.’ ”); Hughes, 855
N.W.2d at 216 (“In sum, the plain language of MCL 15.391(a) establishes that an ‘involuntary
statement’ includes only truthful and factual information.”); id. at 219 (Wilder, J., dissenting)
(“We make every effort to interpret clear and unambiguous language in accordance with its
plain meaning . . . .”).
94. Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 838–39 (majority opinion); id. at 850 n.14 (Markman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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COCA as a resource.95 The opinion then used the COCA to conduct a collo-
cation search.96 This type of search calculates how often a specific word ap-
pears near other words.97 The COCA search box has a specific tab entitled
“Collocates,”98 where the user enters a “node word” (the word that is the
basis of the search). The user then selects the range of words to search—for
example, four words to the right or to the left of the node word.99 The user
can also modify the context of the word—such as searching for only a
word’s verb form100—or the user can search for all the examples where one
particular word appeared within the specified range to the user’s node
word.101 The COCA will then generate a list of the results.102
In Harris, the majority used “information” as its node word and selected
a range of four words to the right and to the left of the word “informa-
tion.”103 As a result, the COCA generated a list that ranked words by how
often they appeared within four words of “information.”104 For example,
“provide” is the word that most frequently appeared within four words of
“information,” appearing 4,223 times.105
95. Id. at 838 (majority opinion) (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 8.3a (West 2004)).
96. Id. at 839 n.33.
97. Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1962 (“ ‘Collocation is the tendency of words to be
biased in the way they co-occur,’ that is, the tendency of certain words to be used in the same
semantic environment as other words.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Hunston, supra note 36,
at 68)).
98. Corpus Contemp. Am. Eng., supra note 27 (follow “Collocates” hyperlink above the
search box).
99. Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 200.
100. See Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1962–63.
101. See, e.g., State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1281–82 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring)
(using the COCA to search for the instances where the nouns “firearm,” “firearms,” “gun,”
and “weapon” appeared within five words of the verb “discharge”).
102. Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1963.
103. People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 839 n.33 (Mich. 2016) (“The collocation search
for ‘information’ is available at Corpus of Contemporary American English, “Information”
Frequency <http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/?c=coca&q=47913597> (accessed June 6, 2016).”).
104. “Information” Collocation Frequency, Corpus Contemp. Am. Eng., http://corpus.
byu.edu/coca/?c=coca&q=47913597 (follow the “Find collocates” hyperlink) [https://perma.
cc/GT9J-9NNR?type=image].
105. Id.
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Figure 1. Returns for the Majority’s Collocation Search
The majority then scanned the ranked list of returns and looked for
adjectives that related to “truth or falsity.”106 The majority used this ap-
proach to determine that the word “accurate” was the most common adjec-
tive “that refers to truth or falsity” located within four words of
“information”; the words “false” and “inaccurate” were also commonly col-
located with “information.”107 This data, the majority reasoned, showed that
in common usage, “ ‘information’ is regularly used in conjunction with ad-
jectives suggesting that it may be both true and false,”108 so the majority
found that the unmodified word “information” could describe either true or
false statements.109 As a result, the majority concluded that the officers’ false
statements constituted “information” and thus could not be used in a crimi-
nal prosecution under the Act.110 The court then reversed the court of ap-
peals’ ruling and reinstated the district court’s order dismissing the
obstruction-of-justice charges for all three officers.111
3. The Dissent’s Use of the COCA
The dissent used a simpler approach than the majority and reached the
opposite conclusion. Justice Markman, joined by Justice Viviano, used the
106. See Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 839 n.33.
107. Id.
108. Id at 839.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 842–43.
111. Id. at 845.
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COCA to search for the number of times the word “information” appeared
in the COCA’s sources.112 This search turned up 168,187 hits.113
Figure 2. Return for the Dissent’s Frequency Search
The dissent then looked to the same collocation-frequency list that the
majority used and found that the adjectives bearing meaning to truth or
falsity rarely modified “information.”114 Specifically, the dissent pointed out
that “truthful” only modified “information” 28 times, “true” only 18 times,
“accurate” 508 times, “inaccurate” 112 times, and “false” 271 times.115 This
totaled 937 times that “information” was modified by these adjectives.116
“The other 167,250 times that the word ‘information’ is used it is unmodi-
fied by one of these adjectives. That is, 99.44% of the time ‘information’ in
the COCA is unmodified by any of these adjectives related to veracity.”117
Most importantly, the dissent did something the majority opinion did
not: it looked at the results in context.118 After every search, the COCA dis-
plays a list of “concordance lines,” which display the word with its sur-
rounding context.119 A concordance line gives a preview of the source
material by showing the node word—in this case, “information”—and the
surrounding text on each side of that word.120 A user can then ask the COCA
to display a random sample of the concordance lines in the search results,
which allows the user to review the node word’s use in context to determine
the word’s ordinary meaning.121
112. Id. at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the
total number of times the word “information” appears in the COCA).
113. Id.; see also “Information” Frequency, Corpus Contemp.Am. Eng., http://corpus.
byu.edu/coca/?c=coca&q=58969614 [https://perma.cc/S4TX-VL36?type=image].





118. Id. (listing examples of the unmodified word “information” from the COCA).
119. Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 197; see also discussion infra Section II.B.
120. Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 197 (stating that the display of concordance lines is
referred to as a “Key Word in Context or KWIC display”).
121. See Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1958; see also “Information” Frequency, supra note
113 (allowing a user to click “information” and display the concordance lines under the “Con-
text” tab; a user can then select a random sample of 100, 200, 500, or 1000 concordance lines).
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The dissent cited multiple concordance lines in support of its conclusion
but did not specify exactly how many lines it reviewed.122 The dissent even
invited the reader “to peruse at random any number of the 167,250 uses of
‘information’ in the COCA and assess whether the term was reasonably used
and understood as indistinguishably referring to true and false informa-
tion.”123 Ultimately, the dissent concluded that the plain meaning of the
word “information” does not include false statements,124 so the statute al-
lowed the State to use the false statements in its obstruction-of-justice case
against the three officers.125
The Harris court was the first to use corpus linguistics, and specifically
the COCA, in a state supreme court majority opinion. Unfortunately for
proponents of using corpus linguistics in statutory interpretation, the very
first decision to use the COCA revealed a potential flaw: reasonable judges
trying their best to use the COCA can reach opposite conclusions.
II. Reviewing the Michigan Supreme Court’s COCA Analysis
This Part asserts that neither opinion in Harris conducted a complete
analysis of the COCA.126 Section II.A contends that the majority erred by
using the wrong search method to determine the meaning of a noun. Sec-
tion II.B argues that, even though the dissent selected the correct search
method, the opinion declined to state how many search returns it reviewed
before arriving at its conclusion, which reduced the dissent’s analytical
transparency.
A. Search Methods
The majority erred by conducting a collocation search127 within the
COCA. It is possible that the Harris majority copied the search technique
used by POGO in its amicus brief for FCC v. AT&T Inc.128 In that case,
however, the question was the meaning of an adjective, not a noun.129
POGO described its mission as follows: “Our method will be to find out
what nouns personal most often modifies, and we will do this by querying
each corpus so that it returns the nouns that appear most frequently in the
122. See Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (listing examples from the COCA that use the unmodified word “information”).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 855.
125. Id. at 861.
126. See infra Section III.D (explaining how to conduct a complete COCA analysis).
127. See supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text.
128. See POGO Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 16.
129. Id. at 2–3.
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position immediately following personal.”130 This is nearly identical to what
the Harris majority did with the word “information.”131
For the Harris majority, however, POGO’s method was inadequate be-
cause POGO was trying to determine the meaning of an adjective, while the
Harris majority was trying to determine the meaning of a noun.132 By defini-
tion, an adjective always modifies something,133 so it made sense for POGO
merely to rank the words that the adjective “personal” modified to deter-
mine its meaning (because the adjective would always be modifying another
word). In contrast, the Harris majority tried to use this same method to
determine the meaning of the noun “information.” But as the dissent made
clear, other words modified “information” only 0.56% of the time.134 A user
must conduct different types of searches for different parts of speech. The
Harris majority used the wrong search method in the COCA to find the
ordinary meaning of “information.”
B. Contextual Review
From the descriptions of the searches that each opinion provided, the
Harris dissent used the COCA more effectively. This conclusion is based on
the familiar principle that the meaning of a word must be drawn from con-
text—not by considering the word in isolation.135 Ultimately, “[b]ecause
common words typically have more than one meaning, you must use the
context in which a given word appears to determine its aptest, most likely
sense.”136 The COCA conveniently provides a tool for this very purpose,
called the Keyword-in-Context or “KWIC.”137
After a user conducts a search, the KWIC displays the search results as a
list of “concordance lines.”138 These lines allow the user to see a twenty-
eight-word snapshot of the source that contains the word that the user
searched.139
130. Id. at 16.
131. See People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 839 n.33 (Mich. 2016) (“In conducting a
COCA search, the word ‘accurate’ is the most common adjective collocated with ‘information’
to bear a meaning that refers to truth or falsity.”).
132. Compare id. at 838–39, with POGO Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 8.
133. Bryan Garner, Garner’s Modern English Usage 19 (4th ed. 2016) (“An adjec-
tive is a word that modifies a noun.”).
134. Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
135. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (citing King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp.,
502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991); Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); United
States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984)); see also Scalia & Garner, supra note 6, at 56
(“[W]ords are given meaning by their context.”).
136. Scalia & Garner, supra note 6, at 418.
137. Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 197.
138. Id.; see, e.g., Figure 3 (showing an example of twenty-five random concordance lines
displayed in the KWIC).
139. Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 197.
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Figure 3. A Random Sample of 25 Concordance Lines for the Word
“Information”
The KWIC would have displayed these concordance lines for the dis-
sent’s search returns of “information.”140 As discussed previously, from the
KWIC display, the user can generate a random sample of 100, 200, 500, or
1,000 concordance lines and then review that sample to avoid the process of
reviewing every single line.141
There is an open question about how many concordance lines a judge
should review.142 If judges were forced to review too many lines, the COCA
would lose its viability as a helpful tool for statutory interpretation. In
Rasabout, Justice Lee’s search returned only eighty-six lines total,143 which
made it easy to review all of them. But in Harris, there were 168,187 concor-
dance lines.144
140. “Information” Frequency, supra note 113 (follow “INFORMATION” hyperlink).
141. Id. (offering the user the option to “find [a] sample” for 100, 200, 500, or 1000
concordance lines in the upper left corner, below the link for “search”).
142. See, e.g., Lindquist, supra note 26, at 56 (“How many concordance lines a lexicogra-
pher needs to write an entry for a word depends on how many different meanings the word in
question has, but twenty is seldom enough.”); Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 197 & n.203 (re-
viewing 1,000 concordance lines for “thoroughness,” but noting that one scholar has suggested
that reviewing 500 concordance lines per 10,000 could be sufficient).
143. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1281–82 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).
144. People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 850 n.14 (Mich. 2016) (Markman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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One linguistics scholar has proposed a solution to analyzing common
words that yield thousands of concordance lines.145 His method takes a sam-
ple of twenty-five to thirty concordance lines, which the COCA provides for
with its “Find Sample” button.146 The judge would examine this sample of
twenty-five to thirty lines and classify them.147 In Harris, the classifications
could have been whether the source used the word “information” (1) to
include both true and false statements, (2) to include only true statements,
or (3) in an ambiguous manner. Then the judge would select another ran-
dom twenty-five to thirty lines and repeat the process.148 The judge would
continue this process until the next set of twenty-five to thirty lines did not
reveal any changes in the observed pattern.149 For example, in Harris, a judge
could have ceased reviewing concordance lines when the new set of lines did
not change the previously observed ratio of possible meanings of “informa-
tion”—among both truthful and false meanings, only truthful meanings,
and ambiguous meanings.
Based on the majority opinion’s description of its analysis, the majority
reviewed zero concordance lines150 and merely ranked the number of times
that the COCA displayed the word “information” being modified by an ad-
jective suggesting truth or falsity.151 Reliance on gross numbers, like the ma-
jority did here, can lead to misleading results152 because “[a] particular word
may have a very broad semantic range and may collocate with numerous
terms.”153 “Information” is such a word. Although the majority’s calculation
was correct, as the dissent pointed out, simply ranking the adjectives that
relate to veracity by the number of times they modified the word “informa-
tion” missed the mark.154 If a word is only modified 0.56% of the time, then
145. John Sinclair, A Way with Common Words, in Out of Corpora: Studies in Hon-
our of Stig Johansson 166 (Hilde Hasselgard & Signe Oksefjell eds., 1999).
146. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. Sinclair describes his method as using the
“every nth” convention, meaning that the user selects a concordance line from an evenly
spaced sequence through the range of concordance lines. Sinclair, supra note 145, at 166. For
example, if there are 300 concordance lines, the reader chooses numbers 1, 11, 21, 31, and so
on until 30 concordance lines have been selected. See id.
147. See Sinclair, supra note 145, at 166.
148. See id.
149. See id. (“This process continues until each new set of instances adds little or nothing
to the description . . . .”).
150. People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 839 n.33 (Mich. 2016).
151. Id. (“In conducting a COCA search, the word ‘accurate’ is the most common adjec-
tive collocated with ‘information’ to bear a meaning that refers to truth or falsity.”).
152. Hunston, supra note 36, at 79 (“It is tempting, when looking at a list of collocates,
to draw conclusions about the overall frequency of compounds and phrases that may not be
justified.”).
153. Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 201.
154. Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“99.44% of the time ‘information’ in the COCA is unmodified by any of these adjectives
related to veracity.”).
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the statistics suggest that the ordinary usage of the word is in an unmodified
form.155
Judges should always review the concordance lines to read the word in
context.156 Justice Lee did this in his Rasabout concurrence: “By examining
the instances of discharge in connection with these nearby nouns, I con-
firmed that the single shot sense of this verb is overwhelmingly the ordinary
sense of the term in this context.”157 He detailed his analysis of the eighty-
one unique concordance lines that the COCA returned for his search.158 The
dissenting opinion in Harris reviewed concordance lines, but it did not indi-
cate exactly how many lines it reviewed159 or whether it used a principled
process to analyze the thousands of concordance lines.160 The dissent wrote
only that the word “information” was “overwhelmingly used to refer to
truthful information.”161 And although the dissent did list two concordance
lines,162 the opinion lacked the detailed description of its concordance-line
review that Justice Lee included in his Rasabout concurrence.163
The Harris dissent should have stated how many concordance lines it
reviewed and what process it used to sift through the thousands of concor-
dance lines. It could have used the random-sample technique to review
groups of twenty-five to thirty random concordance lines until the pattern
of usage for “information” became clear. Thus, the Harris dissent used the
correct search method in the COCA for a noun, but the opinion should have
presented an analysis similar to Justice Lee’s in Rasabout so that the reader
could see exactly what the concordance-line review revealed.164
155. Id.
156. See Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 201 (“[C]ollocations can be helpful as a guide to the
semantic field that a given word may occupy, but they cannot serve as a substitute for review-
ing concordance lines.”).
157. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1282 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).
158. Id. (“Twelve of the eighty-one hits in the COCA search clearly linked discharge to a
single bullet. In sixteen other hits, the discharge was accidental. . . . Fifteen other hits were a bit
more ambiguous; but on closer examination, the discharge in question seemed to imply a
single shot . . . . In thirty-six other instances I concluded there was insufficient detail . . . . In
all, I found only one instance of discharge of a weapon that seemed consistent with the firing
of multiple shots.”).
159. See Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (listing concordance lines, but not identifying how many the dissent reviewed).
160. See supra notes 147–151 and accompanying text.
161. Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
162. See id.
163. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
164. This would change the disagreement from a metaphysical debate about what is the
most ordinary meaning to an empirical debate about what the concordance lines actually say.
See Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1969–70.
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III. The COCA After Harris
This Part argues that, even though judges can misuse the COCA, it is
still a valuable tool that judges should use sua sponte, within the limits of
the database. Section III.A outlines criticism of judges using the COCA sua
sponte. Section III.B addresses this criticism. Section III.C contends that
Harris highlighted the COCA’s greatest asset: transparency. And Section
III.D briefly sets out guidelines for using the COCA effectively.
A. Criticisms of the COCA
Despite the COCA’s value for determining a word’s ordinary mean-
ing,165 use of the COCA has been criticized; indeed, the split in Harris166
potentially justifies some of this criticism. Underlying the Rasabout major-
ity’s criticism was the court’s belief that advocates and judges would find the
database too complicated to use. First, the majority in Rasabout expressed
concern about the cost imposed on parties if the court permitted the use of
the COCA.167 But the COCA is free to all users,168 so the majority’s concern
about cost could not be related to the cost of using the database. Instead, the
majority’s criticism of cost must have been related to its prediction that
COCA analysis “could only be reliably conducted by dueling linguistics
experts.”169
Relatedly, the Rasabout majority argued that this difficulty also coun-
seled against allowing judges to use the COCA sua sponte.170 According to
the majority, this was a “scientific” endeavor, and judges lack the training to
use the COCA.171 The split in Harris potentially supports this concern by
showing that judges could use incorrect search methods if they are unfamil-
iar with the database.172
B. Responses to the Criticism
Section III.B.1 addresses the criticism that parties will need to hire duel-
ing linguistics experts if courts permit the use of the COCA for statutory
165. See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text.
166. See discussion supra Sections I.B.2–I.B.3.
167. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1265 (Utah 2015).
168. See Corpus Contemp. Am. Eng., supra note 27.
169. Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1265.
170. Id. at 1264–65.
171. Id. at 1265.
172. See supra Part II. No party in Harris cited to the COCA in its brief. See Plaintiff-
Appellee’s Amended Brief on Appeal, supra note 83; Defendant-Appellant Hughes’ Brief on
Appeal, People v. Harris, 855 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016) (No. 150042), 2015 WL 9874057;
Appellants’ Brief, Harris, 855 N.W.2d 832 (Nos. 149872, 149873), 2015 WL 9874037.
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interpretation. And Section III.B.2 refutes the argument that judges should
be prohibited from using the COCA sua sponte.173
1. Experts
The Rasabout majority’s concern that litigants will need to hire “linguis-
tics experts” to use the COCA seems misguided. First, the corpus analysis is
“something of a last resort.”174 It is used only when (1) the legislature is not
using a word in a specialized sense and (2) the court cannot reject either
party’s definition based on the context or structure of the statute.175 There-
fore, even if the COCA required experts—which it does not176—using the
database would not lock the courtroom doors “for all but the most
affluent.”177
More importantly, the COCA is free and accessible to anyone. It in-
cludes a tour that describes the basic functions and features of the
database.178 And it offers sample searches that serve as a tutorial for users.179
For each type of search, the website offers additional guidance.180 It is un-
clear whether the Rasabout majority attempted to use the COCA; in light of
the COCA’s tutorials and help guides, however, the concern that parties
would be forced to hire experts to use the database seems unfounded. A
party or advocate may need to spend time to learn how the site functions,
but this time alone does not raise use of the website to the level of scientific,
technical, or specialized knowledge that forms the basis of expert opinion.181
As Justice Lee stated, “Corpus analysis, in all events, is not rocket science.”182
Because of the COCA’s extensive, free online training guides and the fact
that corpus linguistics is not required in every case of dueling interpreta-
tions, the COCA does not close the courtroom doors to the poor.
173. The Rasabout majority did not consider that judges using the COCA sua sponte
could actually reduce the need for parties to conduct their own analysis (because the court
would be doing it anyway), but this Section will address both concerns.
174. Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1286 (Lee, J., concurring).
175. Id.
176. See discussion infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text.
177. Contra Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1265 (majority opinion).
178. Brief Tour, Corpus Contemp. Am. Eng., http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ help/tour.asp
[https://perma.cc/EHZ8-MUSE].
179. Id. (allowing a user to click any of the hyperlinked words to see a sample search with
the word).
180. Corpus Contemp. Am. Eng., supra note 27 (allowing a user to select the “List,”
“Chart,” “Collocates,” “Compare,” or “KWIC” hyperlinks above the search box to reveal a
help guide on the right side of the display).
181. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify . . . .”).
182. Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1286 (Lee, J., concurring).
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2. Sua Sponte Use
The justification for using dictionaries sua sponte justifies using the
COCA sua sponte. In 1875, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in dicta that
judicial notice is appropriate for “the meaning of words in the vernacular
language.”183 In a later case, the Court used a dictionary to define terms
because they were “words of common speech, and, as such, their interpreta-
tion is within the judicial knowledge, and therefore a matter of law.”184 A
judge’s duty undeniably includes interpreting statutes.185 As Justice Lee
wrote, “In performing the core function of deciding what the law is or
should be, we cannot properly be restricted from consulting sources that
inform our understanding.”186 This notion also finds support in the advisory
committee note to Federal Rule of Evidence 201.187
When writing opinions, judges are not limited to using only the cases
cited by the parties.188 More importantly, Justice Lee stressed that the ratio-
nale of his Rasabout opinion was the same as what the parties had briefed:
the ordinary meaning of a phrase in the statute.189 This meant that the par-
ties had briefed the issue, and Justice Lee’s use of the COCA did not violate
the principle of the adversary system.
U.S. Supreme Court precedent instructs judges to interpret statutes ac-
cording to their ordinary meaning,190 so judges are already obligated to en-
gage in linguistic analysis. The majority in Rasabout wrote multiple
paragraphs criticizing Justice Lee’s sua sponte use of the COCA.191 But the
183. Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The
United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 227, 246 (1999) (quoting
Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42 (1875)).
184. Id. at 247 (quoting Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 12 (1885)).
185. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994).
186. Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1284 (Lee, J., concurring).
187. Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) advisory committee’s note (“Professor Morgan gave the follow-
ing description of the methodology of determining domestic law: ‘In determining the content
or applicability of a rule of domestic law, the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and
conclusion. He may reject the propositions of either party or of both parties. He may consult
the sources of pertinent data to which they refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make an
independent search for persuasive data or rest content with what he has or what the parties
present.’ . . . This is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative facts.” (citation
omitted) (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 270–71
(1944)).
188. See, e.g., Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1284 n.35 (Lee, J., concurring) (“On issues that are
squarely presented . . . we regularly do take it upon ourselves to conduct independent legal
research. No party would be surprised to read an opinion citing authority not presented in the
briefs, or analysis taking a somewhat different angle than the parties.”).
189. Id. at 1283.
190. See, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995).
191. See supra Section III.A.
324 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:303
Supreme Court’s decision in Muscarello shows that judges already use mater-
ials outside of dictionaries to find ordinary meaning.192 The COCA, how-
ever, looks at a far greater range of material than a particular justice’s
handpicked book.193 The question, then, is whether to use novel tools to
solve an age-old problem.
In response to the Rasabout majority’s fears, Justice Lee somewhat hu-
morously recalled when online databases—such as Westlaw and Lexis—were
first introduced.194 As he put it, “[S]ome even predicted that computer-
based research would undermine the lawyer’s craft.”195 He proceeded to cite
three law review articles that warned of the supposed impending profes-
sional crisis that would be ushered in by online legal databases.196 For exam-
ple, one warned that computer-aided legal research would “undermine the
ability to think like a lawyer.”197 Another argued that computer-aided legal
research “may be harmful to the process of legal reasoning.”198 And lastly,
Justice Lee stated that “the title says it all” for Scott P. Stolley’s article Short-
comings of Technology: The Corruption of Legal Research.199 All of this is to say
that there will often be skeptics when a new tool with unfamiliar technology
is used to tackle an old problem.200
Although judges may err as they learn to use a new tool for statutory
interpretation, judges can also err when they use old tools. In Muscarello, the
majority began its entire analysis by stressing the order of the possible defi-
nitions within the dictionary.201 The opinion listed each dictionary’s “first”
definition and italicized the word to emphasize the seeming importance of a
particular definition being listed first.202 But this is not how dictionaries
work.203 The Oxford English Dictionary and Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary state explicitly that they rank their definitions historically,
meaning that older definitions are listed first and more recent definitions are
192. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1998) (citing to Robinson
Crusoe, Moby Dick, and the New York Times, among other sources).
193. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
194. Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1282 (Lee, J., concurring).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1282 n.31.
197. Id. (citing Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in
the Computer Age, 88 Law Libr. J. 338, 339 (1996)).
198. Id. (quoting Molly Warner Lien, Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law
Lawyer, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 85, 85–86 (1998)).
199. Id. (citing Scott P. Stolley, Shortcomings of Technology: The Corruption of Legal Re-
search, For Def., Apr. 2004, at 39, 39).
200. Id. at 1282.
201. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998)
202. Id.
203. See Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1926–38 (describing this error as the “sense-ranking
fallacy”).
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listed last.204 The error in Muscarello shows that judges can misuse even es-
tablished tools. The possibility that judges could misuse the COCA is not a
sufficient reason for prohibiting them from conducting the analysis sua
sponte. Judges can surely learn how to use the COCA consistently, and they
will benefit from the effort.205
In the field of statutory interpretation, some have suggested that a prin-
ciple or canon of construction is useless if two judges can reach different
conclusions when applying the principle or canon in good faith. Karl Llewel-
lyn famously wrote that “there are two opposing canons on almost every
point” before listing twenty-eight proposed examples.206 Judge Posner (not a
proponent of the canons of construction)207 wrote that some observers think
the canons “are figleaves for decisions reached on other grounds.”208
That a tool can potentially be misused is no reason to disregard the tool
entirely. Rather, as Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner wrote in response to
Llewellyn’s law review article:
Principles of interpretation are guides to solving the puzzle of textual
meaning, and as in any good mystery, different clues often point in differ-
ent directions . . . . The skill of sound construction lies in assessing the
clarity and weight of each clue and deciding where the balance lies.209
The same principle applies to the use of corpus linguistics. The risk that
judges can possibly misuse the COCA is not a reason to cease using what has
the potential to become a powerful tool in statutory interpretation’s search
for ordinary meaning. Justice Scalia and Garner’s defense of the canons of
construction applies with equal force to the use of the COCA.210 Corpus
linguistics should not be abandoned, and courts should be free to use the
method sua sponte.211
204. See id. at 1933 & n.101. The Supreme Court is not alone in making this mistake. See
id. at 1928 n.79 (citing two federal circuit opinions that mistakenly analyze a dictionary’s first
listed definition as the primary definition).
205. See Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 2027,
2060 (2005) (arguing that computers make it easy for judges to research the lexicon and that
“[i]f they perform that task seriously, they stand to learn more about how words are ordinarily
used, than by today’s method of fighting over which dictionary is the most authoritative”).
206. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401–06 (1950).
207. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 806, 816 (1983) (calling the canons “[v]acuous and
inconsistent”).
208. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 917 F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1990).
209. Scalia & Garner, supra note 6, at 59.
210. See id. at 61 (“Yes, they can be abused, as every useful tool can be abused. But we
should hardly abandon them.”).
211. In light of this, advocates should include a corpus-based analysis in their briefs when
arguing about the ordinary meaning of a word.
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C. The Value of Transparency
The split in Harris reveals the COCA’s greatest strength: transparency.
As Mouritsen wrote, “[T]he corpus method removes the determination of
ordinary meaning from the black box of the judge’s mental impression and
renders the discussion of ordinary meaning one of tangible and quantifiable
reality.”212 This transparency serves two goals. First, it provides for meaning-
ful appellate review because the COCA allows a judge to describe her meth-
odology and analysis.213 Judges can save their searches and include the links
in their opinions so that reviewing courts, advocates, or scholars can repli-
cate the search, conduct the analysis for themselves, and determine whether
the court got it right or wrong.214 Second, this review process could resolve
one of the criticisms of the COCA because it allows the judiciary to refine its
use of the COCA by learning from published opinions that describe search
methods and analyses.
Therefore, courts should describe their analysis in order to maximize
the COCA’s benefit to transparency. The COCA is better than a dictionary
because the COCA’s transparency prevents a judge from asserting that a
particular definition from a particular dictionary is the ordinary meaning,
based on nothing more than the judge’s intuition.215 The COCA’s trans-
parency prohibits this intuitive assertion and forces judges to support their
determination of ordinary meaning with data—which provides something
tangible to refute or endorse.216 Thus, the Harris split is not evidence of
corpus linguistics’ inability to help resolve questions of ordinary meaning.
Instead, we are now able to review the court’s analysis of what constitutes
ordinary meaning and actually comment on whether it was correct.
D. Steps to Use the COCA
As Harris shows, the legal community may take time to learn how to use
the COCA effectively for statutory interpretation. Part of this Note’s aim is
to provide some basic guidance for future use of the COCA. The first step is
to select the proper corpus. This selection will often be determined by the
year of enactment for the statute being interpreted because courts generally
look to the meaning of the words at the time they were enacted.217 Users can
212. Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1970; see also State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1286
(Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring) (“I am convinced that [corpus-based analysis] is essential to
a more reliable, transparent fulfillment of [interpretation].”).
213. See Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1283 (“A judge who presents a transparent corpus analysis
opens the curtain in a manner allowing the parties to review and analyze his approach, and
even challenge it . . . .”).
214. Id. at 1281.
215. See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.
216. Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 203.
217. See, e.g., Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2165 & n.2 (2015)
(using dictionaries from 1933 and 1934 to determine the meaning of “services” because Con-
gress added the language to the federal bankruptcy law in 1934); Cuomo v. Clearing House
Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 526–29 (2009) (determining the meaning of “visitation” in 1864, the year
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choose from a number of corpora. The COCA allows users to search texts
published between 1990 and 2015.218 Another corpus, the Corpus of Histori-
cal American English (“COHA”) allows users to search for words by decade
from texts published between 1810 and 2009.219 And the forthcoming
Corpus of Founding-Era American English (“COFEA”) will cover the period
from 1760 to 1799.220
Once users select the best corpus for the job, they must determine the
type of word they are trying to define because users should use different
searches for different parts of speech.221 This was the Harris majority’s mis-
take.222 If a user searches for the meaning of an adjective—like in POGO’s
amicus brief223—then a collocation search will show the nouns that the ad-
jective most commonly modifies and thus what the adjective ordinarily
means. But when the question is the meaning of a noun, like in Harris,224 a
collocation search will fail to determine a word’s ordinary meaning if the
word ordinarily appears alone. The COCA does not function like a search
engine where the user can simply ask what the word means.225 Therefore, a
user must be certain to select the proper search method.
After users conduct the search, they must determine how to review the
concordance lines. If the number of concordance lines is manageable—as it
was with Rasabout’s eighty-six concordance lines226—the user should review
all of them. If, like Harris, the search returns thousands of concordance
Congress enacted the National Bank Act). But see Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1479 (“Statutes,
however, should—like the Constitution and the common law—be interpreted ‘dynamically,’
that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal context.”).
218. See Corpus Contemp. Am. Eng., supra note 27 (stating that the COCA dates back to
1990).
219. Mouritsen, supra note 20, at 1967. The COHA contains over 400 million words from
works that were published between 1810 and 2009. James C. Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics
& Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 Yale L.J.F.
21, 26, 30–31 (2016), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/10.Phillips.MACROEDFINAL_izrkk2
s8.pdf [https://perma.cc/79RG-JZHN]. Some scholars hope to begin using corpus linguistics to
aid in originalist constitutional interpretation as well. See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Can
Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 Yale L.J.F. 57 (2016), http://www.
yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Solanforwebsitepdf_tryz9ksn.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAL2-ZYJY ] (con-
cluding that using corpus linguistics “should bring the practice of originalist analysis closer to
its goal of discovering original public meaning”).
220. Phillips et al., supra note 219, at 31.
221. See supra Section II.A.
222. See supra Section II.A.
223. See POGO Amicus Brief, supra note 55.
224. See Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 837–38 (clarifying that the plain language of the word
“information” controls the resolution of the case).
225. See Hunston, supra note 36, at 3 (“Strictly speaking, a corpus by itself can do noth-
ing at all, being nothing other than a store of used language. Corpus access software, however,
can re-arrange that store so that observations of various kinds can be made.”).
226. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1281–82 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).
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lines,227 the user should apply the method described in Section II.B.228 Then
users must utilize the KWIC229 to read through the search returns and ob-
serve how the word is used in context. This process is the heavy lifting of a
COCA search, but it is necessary to conduct a complete analysis because
data alone do not determine the meaning of a word.
To maximize the COCA’s attribute of transparency, judges and lawyers
should include the details of their searches and analyses in their opinions
and briefs.230 Legal writers can even include the links to their searches.231
These details will permit reviewing judges to scrutinize the analysis on ap-
pellate review.
Conclusion
The Michigan Supreme Court recognized the COCA’s contribution to
the search for ordinary meaning—every single justice signed onto an opin-
ion using the COCA to interpret the statute. And the shortcomings of the
Harris majority’s analysis revealed the COCA’s contribution to judicial
transparency. This Note was made possible only because both opinions in
Harris described their search method, linked to their search results, and de-
tailed their analysis. This transparency permits appellate judges, lawyers,
scholars, and, yes, law students to review the court’s work. That the Michi-
gan Supreme Court reached different conclusions after using the COCA
does not show that the COCA’s results are ambiguous; rather, this Note
argues, one side got it right and the other got it wrong. This type of review
will increase the value of the COCA as a tool for statutory interpretation as
the legal community learns to use the database more effectively.
227. People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 850 n.14 (Mich. 2016) (Markman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the dissent’s search returned 168,187 concordance
lines).
228. See supra notes 145–149 and accompanying text.
229. See Mouritsen, supra note 35, at 197.
230. See, e.g., POGO Amicus Brief, supra note 55, apps. B–G (listing POGO’s corpora
analyses).
231. See, e.g., Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 839 n.33 (majority opinion); Rasabout, 356 P.3d at
1281 n.29 (Lee, J., concurring).
